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As the last speaker of the day, I appear before you with consid-
erable trepidation, not only because you have heard a lot of
speeches by now, but because before I came I read a statement
made by one of my colleagues on the Ninth Circuit. It appeared in
the Federalist Society article passed out to you today, "Right Place
at the Right Time." The article says that you clapped thunderously
as my colleague Judge Noonan boomed in righteous indignation,
"the enemy is ranting, empty-headed, mealy-mouthed liberalism."
Well, I will try not to be empty-headed or mealy-mouthed, but I
guess I am the enemy, at least, according to my colleague Judge
Noonan-because I stand here today not only as a judge but as an
unreconstructed liberal.
I do not condemn all conservatives. Nor do I believe all con-
servatives have disrespect for the law-only some. The political at-
tack on the role of law and the courts engaged in today by the
Justice Department's representative is not only unseemly, it is unfor-
tunately nothing new. Whether it is that the executive branch is
above the law, or that the Supreme Court should have no respect for
precedent, the Department's message is and has been, consistent. It
is not too surprising that there was little mention of justice by the
representative of the Justice Department. It is surprising, however,
that there is respect neither for law nor order. It is not my place, as
I said, to judge any or all conservatives today, or to fulfill Mr.
Cooper's prophecy that liberals will tell conservatives to obey the
law. Rather, I will try to tell you how I as a liberal try to apply the
law, and how I try to answer the question of the conflict between
text and precedent in constitutional adjudication.
Preliminarily, I should say I am a strong believer in precedent.
I think that our willingness to respect precedent has made our legal
system the success it is, and I believe firmly that we must interpret
our Constitution in light of the precedent which has been developed
over the past 200 years. Still, we all agree that there are times when
precedent may properly be overruled. One way to explain when this
t Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. B.A. 1951, Pomona
College; LL.B. 1954, Yale Law School.
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may be done in constitutional cases is to put it in terms of today's
topic-when precedent conflicts with the Constitution.
The basic question is how do we determine whether there is
such a conflict? Must there be a conflict with the text, or is a pur-
ported conflict with the intent of the drafters enough? Must the
conflict be with the literal language of the Constitution or the foun-
ders, or may it be with the purpose or objectives that underlay the
choice of particular terms or phrases? How certain should a judge
be of the true meaning of the Constitution before he votes to over-
ride precedent? The topic raises all the issues inherent in the ques-
tion, "How should a judge reach decisions?"
Hard as it may be to accept, there are no absolutist answers to
these or almost any other questions in the law. There are frequently
several plausible and potentially correct answers. Often there is no
necessary answer. The basic questions posed today and the basic
questions we face as judges are steeped in uncertainty. All require
judgment, application of philosophy, values, yes, balancing. And all
require a sense ofjustice-a sense that is too often lacking. The fact
that there may be a choice among plausible answers makes law no
less important a tool, and compliance with the law, including judi-
cial decisions, no less essential a responsibility.
We cannot leave it to each President and each individual to de-
cide which parts of the law he will obey. Fifteen years ago, we had a
President who thought he was above the law, who thought he was
not required to obey the law. I thought the question of the Presi-
dent's accountability was put to rest at that time, and I think it must
now be answered unequivocally in the affirmative if any doubt re-
mains. To me, that is what the legal system is about, that is what the
Constitution is about. Respect for law, respect for justice, and re-
spect for order applies to all of us-Presidents, judges, Congress-
men. If the President can disobey the law or treat Court decisions
as non-precedential, Congressmen should be able to disobey the
law, and I suppose we judges would also be free to ignore the
Supreme Court. Sometimes it may seem to some of you as if we
judges do that. I can assure you that we do not do it deliberately.
We may have legitimate disagreements, but all judges I know, con-
servatives and liberals, try to follow the law as they understand it.
We may have some disagreements on how we reach our decisions,
but I do not know any judge personally, or any judge with whom I
have had contact, who does not believe it is his duty to follow, obey,
and apply the law. I do not think we believe we have any greater
right than anyone else in this country to disregard the law.
Now, whether you obtain your meaning of the Constitution by
limiting your examination to what you believe a number of individu-
435
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
als thought two hundred years ago, whether you believe there is a
discoverable natural law waiting for you to come along and reveal it,
or whether you believe that you should look for basic constitutional
concepts and apply them to society's changing circumstances in
light of society's changing values, you are still only talking about
selecting a technique. No particular technique leads to a necessary
result when we decide legal problems. One can rely solely on the
literal words of the Constitution and still find oneself faced with two
equally plausible interpretations. So, too, we can look at the legisla-
tive history or the words of the founders and not know the "right"
answer with any certainty. Most often the answer we reach is influ-
enced by our fundamental philosophy as to the role of government
and the rights of individuals. These basic views dictate the conclu-
sions judges reach more often than does our choice of process.
Nevertheless, the process is important, and the technique is
also. But none of these questions are as simple as they appear. The
technique, like all else, is ordinarily a mixture, a melange. We do
not just read the language of the Constitution and ignore the words
of the founders. We do not just read the words of the founders and
ignore the language of the Constitution. We do not just read both
and ignore the cases that the Supreme Court has decided. Finally,
we do not overlook the philosophy of the law that we have devel-
oped over a lifetime, through study and experience, through pain
and through turmoil. Judging is a complex matter, and we look at
all of the factors, subjective and objective. Now, that brings us to
the unfortunate fact that in the end we need to apply our individual
intelligence, our individual understanding, our individual judgment,
as judges, to those problems. Fortunately, (to respond to the Solici-
tor General's comments) we are not janitors. Fortunately we have
been trained to use the best legal reasoning and the best legal
processes possible to arrive at what we believe to be the correct an-
swers-to exercise our best possible judgment. That is all we can
do in a system of law and justice administered by mortals.
Now, let us consider a specific question. Was there a conflict
between the fourteenth amendment and Plessy v. Ferguson?l Some
would say yes, some would say no, even today. Conversely, does
Brown v. Board of Education2 conflict with the intent of the drafters of
the fourteenth amendment? Again, we can probably find legitimate
disagreement on that point. Certainly, it is a historical fact that
those who supported the fourteenth amendment also supported a
system of segregated schools. While I think that most of us now
agree that the answer to the constitutional question is clear, it is
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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certainly not one that could be arrived at simply and unequivocally
by reading the literal words of the Constitution or examining the
intent of its adapters.
The question whether a conflict between text and precedent ex-
ists is usually a murky one. Almost never, if ever, is there a conflict
between the plain, unambiguous, literal language of the Constitu-
tion and precedent. If it were all that clear from the literal language,
the first Justices to address the issue would normally perceive that
fact and follow the plain meaning.
3
The real issue is when should the Supreme Court overrule pre-
cedent. As I have already noted, there is almost never a conflict
between precedent and theplain meaning of the constitutional lan-
guage, at least not one that is apparent to most judges. There may,
however, be a conflict between precedent and the "true" meaning of
the constitutional provision even if that meaning is not apparent
simply from a quick, literal reading of the constitutional language.
We may, in some instances, have to study history. We may have to
attempt to obtain a fuller understanding of constitutional purposes
and objectives through a variety of examinations and disciplines.
So, what do we do when we think that there may be a conflict? How
do we decide whether there is in fact a conflict between the meaning
of the Constitution and precedent? Well, as I said, there are various
techniques, but in most instances none leads to a necessary answer.
Part of the problem is our reluctance to acknowledge what we
do when we make choices. A good example is found in three cases
decided in one decade by the United States Supreme Court. First,
in Logan Valley,4 in 1968, the Court said that there was a free speech
right to picket in shopping centers during labor disputes. In 1972,
in Lloyd v. Tanner,5 the Court said that Vietnam protesters were dif-
ferent; they were not allowed to picket in shopping centers. In
1976, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 6 the Court said there is no difference be-
tween labor speech and political speech; therefore, the picketing
permitted in Logan Valley must be prohibited under Lloyd. Accord-
ingly, the court overruled Logan in the name of respecting the prece-
dent established by Lloyd, although Lloyd expressly said it was not
3 In this discussion I am talking about the role of the Justices rather than the role
of circuit court judges. In our circuit, as in Judge Easterbrook's, we are not free as a
panel of three judges to overrule our own precedent. Only an en banc court can do that,
and we sit infrequently en banc and only rarely overrule our own precedent when we do.
So, with rare exceptions, the answer to when a precedent should be followed in our
court is clear-always.
4 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
5 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
6 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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overruling Logan. I think a legitimate criticism may be offered of the
Supreme Court's technique because there was a deception in the
way the Court arrived at its result. There was a lack of honesty that
can only injure the judicial system.
There is too little honesty in all too many of our opinions when
we describe how we reach our conclusions. For example, and I am
as guilty of this as anyone else, when you finish reading one of our
opinions, ordinarily you would think that the judge believed there
was not the slightest possible doubt as to the proper outcome. The
arguments in the opinion appear so persuasive, at least to the au-
thor. The result seems so simple and obvious; all the arguments
favor one side. But that is not how it really is. There are hidden
choices in every decision, choices that are difficult and complex, that
take us down different roads and lead us ultimately to different re-
sults. We ought more frequently acknowledge that there is real
doubt as to the outcome, set forth in our opinions some of the
doubts we have, and admit to some of the choices that we have
made along the way.
Now, in making those choices, I would have to say that every
judge I have ever known is influenced by his fundamental philoso-
phy of law and of life, by the changes that have occurred in society,
by his view of his role as ajudge, and his view of the legal system, as
well as by stare decisis. The choices involve personal, subjective ele-
ments, but they fit within an orderly process of reasoning, within a
logical, rational process of attempting to determine the meaning of
the law. Some people in this country have a longing for simplistic
answers, for the return to a simpler society, to a day when law was
law and men were white males. It would be nice if we could fit all of
our problems into neat little pigeonholes, if we could all become
janitors, or even computer operators who need do very little but
push a button and obtain an answer from a machine. But most
problems that concern the public do not have simplistic solutions,
and they require judges to judge, to exercise judgment, to do their
best to try to understand what the law is.
Our basic constitutional principles are ordinarily stated quite
broadly. We can legitimately draw various interpretations and justi-
fications, and precedent usually exists on both sides. The primary
disputes that we have today reflect longstanding differing views of
the law, both procedural and substantive. Often, one view has pre-
vailed in some occasions and the opposite view on others. We can
find numerous cases in the books adopting the varying principal
views. As judges, we can find persuasive precedent for almost
everything, and, in many cases, we can find strong precedent for
both sides of the argument. That is when our judgment is required.
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1988] CONFLICT BETWEEN TEXT AND PRECEDENT
Now, when a Justice decides, through whatever complex pro-
cess of reasoning he follows, that under his view of the meaning of
the Constitution a precedent conflicts with that document, or to put
it differently, that he believes that the last group ofJustices to con-
sider the issue was wrong, under what circumstances should he vote
to overrule precedent? Here, I think I agree in part with Judge Eas-
terbrook, although I am not certain how much.7 I know he does not
like balancing, but he agreed that often there is no clear answer, that
there are a number of factors to consider. I believe we must give
weight in varying degrees to a number of factors, and I do not think
we can do it by applying the law of economics. I do not think we can
engage in a statistical analysis. I do not think we can profitably ap-
ply a cost-benefit analysis.
Yet there are factors that we must apply. It is easier to list the
factors than to say what a judge should do once he identifies them.
The factors are as follows: How sure is a Justice that he is right?
How well established is the "erroneous" precedent? How wrong
does the Justice believe the precedent to be? How important are the
rights involved in light of the Justice's own view of the essence of
the Constitution? How disruptive will the change be? How likely is
the reversal to last and be stable?8 Is there a principled way to limit
rather than overrule the precedent?9
Now take all these factors and add them up, and there is still no
mechanical system, no mathematical formula, that allows you to ar-
rive at a foreordained judgment. We cannot assign points to each
factor, and even if we could, not one of them is itself subject to a
precise mathematical application. Each invites an answer from a
scale rather than an absolute yes or no. So in the end we must make
an overall judgment by weighing and balancing-yes, this will often
yield a subjective judgment, but always, we would hope, a principled
and reasoned one.
What we could do to aid those who should have more respect
for law and order, and for judicial decisions, is to strip the masks,
remove the mysteries, eliminate the rationalizations, expose the
myriad of choices, and make them understand that law is truly com-
plex. They should also understand that judges are generally honest,
decent people. Judges do apply their personal philosophies, and
7 I do not believe, for example, that a precedent is without force simply because
reasonable men could arrive at a different result or the decision was issued by a divided
Court.
8 See Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985), in which he suggests that the next time there is an appoint-
ment to the Court, the Justices will reverse the precedent once again.
9 Is that what Justice Powell attempted to do in advance, somewhat inartfully, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)?
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that is why the judges who have been appointed during this adminis-
tration generally have one philosophy, and why many of the judges
appointed in the past administration have another. Unfortunately,
the last administration did not have an Attorney General who was as
committed to a particular philosophy of law as the present one. I
have no criticism of the present Attorney General for having that
kind of commitment. I wish some of the past ones, however, had
had a similar commitment to their administration's point of view.
To end with a specific: if basic human rights are involved there
is far more reason to overrule precedent than in other cases. Now,
that reflects my view of what the Constitution stands for; others will
disagree. I believe that our understanding of fundamental rights
changes as society progresses. We no longer put people in stocks or
stone them, although we still have capital punishment. If the Con-
stitution expresses a set of fundamental principles, as I believe it
does, then its interpretation must change with the times.
In my opinion, historicists, or as they sometimes like to call
themselves, interpretivists, do an injustice to the Constitution if they
seek to freeze its meaning so that a particular clause can be applied
only to specific circumstances contemplated at the time of its enact-
ment. I will not get into that debate here. But if at the time of Plessy
v. Ferguson 10 we thought separate but equal was constitutional, it was
because that was the specific view of at least some framers of the
fourteenth amendment. Was that their general view as well? That is
the issue you heard about earlier. But more important than whether
the specific or general intent should control, or even what the gen-
eral intent was (and each side can find arguments as to whether
Plessy should have been overruled under traditional criteria), by the
time Brown v. Board of Education11 was decided society simply knew
better. Therefore, the court was right when it overruled an errone-
ous precedent. Plessy was a fundamental decision that adversely af-
fected basic rights, and that, we learned with the passage of time and
with increased wisdom, was contrary to the essence of our Constitu-
tion. That knowledge alone, regardless of the applicability of the
other criteria, necessitated the abandonment of Plessy as precedent.
To me the Constitution is not a cold, bloodless document. This
country and our Constitution stand for far more than freedom of
contract, far more than Adam Smith's economics. They stand for a
government that will promote the general welfare, and for the right
of individuals to be free from arbitrary governmental actions. The
Constitution stands for a just society, and forjustice. In my opinion
when Justices make their decisions, when they decide whether to
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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overrule what they think may be erroneous precedent, they should
do so with those fundamental concepts firmly in mind.
To conclude, there is unfortunately no simple answer to the
question before us today. Sometimes precedent should be over-
ruled; sometimes it should not. There is no mechanical, no mathe-
matical, no rigid formula for deciding when. Justices must weigh
the various factors they have identified as important in making such
determinations. Unfortunately, we may not agree on all of those
factors; some of us might utilize different ones. But whoever is on
the Court must take precedent seriously, must apply the factors he
deems appropriate, and must do his best to try to give the Constitu-
tion the interpretation he believes proper, in light of history, in light
of its text, in light of precedent, and in light of the fundamental
values that the Constitution incorporates and that illuminate its
meaning.
